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THE PROVISION OF SOCIAL BENEFITS IN STATE-OWNED,
PRIVATIZED AND PRIVATE FIRMS IN POLAND1
S. Estrin, M.E. Schaffer and I.J. Singh
Introduction
It was a standard observation in texts about socialist economies that enterprises
provided extensive non-wage social benefits (Gregory and Stuart, 1989; Wiles, 1977),
though the actual scale of the provision was rarely indicated. The existence of
significant social benefits at the enterprise level, and the implications for
restructuring, privatization and the transformation process in general has also been
frequently noted in the transition literature (Fischer and Gelb, 1991; Portes, 1993;
Frydman, Rapaczynski and Earle, 1993; Estrin, 1994).  Yet, there has been virtually
no detailed information about the nature and scope of enterprise-level provision of
social benefits, let alone any attempts to analyze either its diversity or its
determinants.  Finally, while there are frequent assertions about how enterprise-level
social provision is changing with transition, privatization and the emergence of the
new private sector, there is no hard evidence on the matter.  It is these inadequacies
in our knowledge that we seek to redress in this paper, which draws on the evidence
from a three-year panel of approximately 200 Polish firms.
Non-wage social provision is an interesting issue because it is a factor
influencing both labour supply and product market structure in the transition
process.  While analysts know that social provision to employees was often extensive,
there has been little empirical indication of its scale, its diversity and of the factors
encouraging its use by some firms but not others.  These factors are important
because over-extensive social provision could raise the costs of enterprise
restructuring, and may alienate potential foreign investors if they are forced to take
these assets on along with the more productive ones.  Aghion, Blanchard and Burgess
(1994) have suggested that the degree of social provision may also influence the
structure of coalitions emerging in support of unbundling, typically in the direction
of hindering restructuring.  On the labour side, social provision restricts labour
mobility, so its sectoral and structural pattern may be an important explanatory factor
in regional unemployment differences.  By raising the effective wage paid in the state
2sector, social provision also places pressure on private firms who wish to recruit -
either to match in terms of social provision or to substitute through higher pay.
Finally, the pre-existence of social 
benefits provides the state sector with a simple route to raise total remuneration even
in the presence of tax-based incomes policies.  We will test hypotheses based on these
ideas in the latter sections of the paper.
The main findings of the paper are that social benefits are concentrated in
state-owned firms.  To a considerable extent, they are also present in privatized
companies, but are found considerably less frequently in the de novo private sector.
The extent of provision within the state sector is primarily determined by enterprise
size and is correlated with the level of wages.  However, it is interesting to find that
provision is also positively related to indicators of employee power.  Social provision
has been declining in state-owned and privatized firms, but increasing (modestly) in
new private firms.  On average the decline in the state-owned and formerly state-
owned sectors is surprisingly small.  The key determinants of the pace of change are
the size of the firm and its profitability; in the case of the state-owned sector,
provision also declines more slowly when the tax-based income policy (the
"popiwek") binds.
There are a further three sections in this paper.  In the next section, we briefly
outline the methodology of the survey and provide summary statistics about
enterprise behaviour in Poland over the sample period, 1991-1993.  The nature and
scope of social benefits is outlined in the third section, and simple hypotheses about
the determinants of provision are tested.  In the fourth section, we summarize and
attempt to explain the recent changes in social provision including changes in
investments in social assets.  Conclusions are drawn in the final section.
1.  Sample Size, Selection and Characteristics
The survey was sponsored by the World Bank Research Project on Enterprise
Behaviour and Economic Reform, and was undertaken between November 1993 and
March 1994 by a team of Polish economists headed by Professor Marek Belka.  A
survey questionnaire in two parts was administered to 200 enterprises in the
manufacturing sector.  Seven of the original 200 firms withdrew from the survey after
3they had supplied most of the requested information and were replaced with seven
additional firms, giving a total sample size of 207.  The first part of the questionnaire
was undertaken primarily by interview with senior managers, and involved
qualitative questions about a variety of subjects including marketing, technology,
employment, finance and corporate governance.  A few of these questions covered
social benefits and social issues.  The second part of the questionnaire was
quantitative and drew on various elements of the firm's profit and loss accounts,
balance sheets and other economic data for the three years 1991-1993.
The minimum firm size covered in the sample was 25 employees.  The sample
was stratified by ownership form as follows:  40 enterprises were emerging (de novo)
private firms (POE's); 45 were privatized firms (PRE's); 41 were state-owned firms
which had been converted into joint stock companies ("commercialized",
"corporatized") and were awaiting privatization (SA's) and 80 were traditional (not
yet commercialized) state-owned firms (SOE's).  Within these categories the selection
of firms was random.  All major manufacturing subsectors are well-represented.  In
our analysis we do not weight by size, and there are only minor differences between
the sectoral distribution of the firms in our sample compared to the weight of sectors
in aggregate manufacturing employment.
The first four tables provide a picture of the firms in our sample, and of the
key differences in situation and enterprise economic performance by ownership type
in Poland at the end of 1993.  This picture is of considerable interest in its own right
because of the shortcomings of the available data on the Polish private sector
published by the Polish Central Statistical Office.  Though the quality of these data
is probably the best among transition countries, they suffer from two important
drawbacks.  First, the CSO data make no distinction between the de novo private
sector and the privatized sector.  Second, the CSO definition of the "private sector"
in use since 1991 includes cooperatives.  Poland began the transition with a
substantial number of manufacturing cooperatives, accounting for 13% of industrial
employment in 1989 compared to 17% for the emerging private sector proper.
During the communist period Polish cooperatives had little real autonomy, but the
situation in the transition is quite different and in this sense cooperatives are correctly
classified as part of the private sector.  Cooperative performance has, however, been
4quite poor during the transition, and over the period 1989-1993 the output and
employment of industrial cooperatives has roughly halved, though even now their
weight in manufacturing is still substantial relative to the emerging private sector.2
At the same time, the emerging private sector, by all accounts, has enjoyed explosive
growth and now accounts for perhaps one-third or more of total industrial output.
The Polish CSO statistics on the private sector thus unfortunately combine what are
several quite distinct ownership groups: de novo private firms, formerly state-owned
firms that have been privatized, and cooperatives.3
We note first from Table 1 that, as expected, most de novo private firms are
small, and most state firms (SA's and SOE's) are large.  However it is encouraging
that there are already a few large de novo private firms, and that more than one third
of privatized firms are small or medium-sized.  It is also noteworthy that virtually
all commercialized firms are large.  The reason for this is that the bulk of these firms
are to be included in the Polish Mass Privatization Programme (MPP) and so had to
be converted into joint stock companies.
The Polish industrial sector began to grow again in 1992 after a deep recession,
and total manufacturing output grew by 12% in 1993.  Tables 2 and 3 provide a
picture of how the growth was distributed between the ownership types.
Commencing with sales growth in Table 2, we find rapid real growth (in excess of
10%) concentrated in the private sector, both in privatized and especially in de novo
private firms.  Only a minority of SOE's and merely a quarter of commercialized
firms display rapid sales growth.  On the other hand, the macroeconomic expansion
is leaving few firms out completely; only 5% of private firms and 20% or less of state-
owned firms were still shrinking in 1993.
The picture is rather different for employment growth, reflecting the fact that
current and former state-owned firms often still had significant amounts of hoarded
labour, and that private firms need to employ extra workers in order to grow.  Thus
a third or more of PRE's, SA's and SOE's record rapid employment reductions; in
each case, higher proportions than display rapid declines in sales.  Almost none of
the state-owned and formerly state-owned firms record rapid increases in
employment, as against 50% of de novo private firms.  Thus sales growth is fairly
5widely dispersed, though more marked in the private sector, while employment
growth is concentrated in de novo private firms.
Finally, the pre-tax profit margin by ownership type is reported in Table 4.
Although there is considerable dispersion of profitability within ownership groups,
the patterns are more or less as predicted.  The bulk of emerging private sector firms
have near positive (margins of -5% to 5%) or high (margins above 5%) profitability;
the privatized and commercialized categories have substantial numbers of both firms
with large losses (margins below -5%) as well as firms with large profits; and most
traditional state-owned firms are either roughly breaking even or making large losses.
It is also interesting that a slightly higher proportion of commercialized firms have
profits in excess of 5% of sales than do privatized firms.
In summary, most de novo private firms are small, while most state-owned
firms and especially the commercialized ones are large.  Privatized firms can be both
medium-sized or large.  Growth in 1993 was widely diffused through the economy,
but rather more concentrated in private firms, while financial distress as revealed by
low profit margins was concentrated in the state-owned sector.
2.  Scope and Determinants of Enterprise Social Provision
The survey instrument contained questions about the nature of social provision
within each firm, as well as information about factors which might in principle
explain the extent of enterprise-level social benefits.  In this section, we briefly survey
the scope of social provision, before testing some simple hypotheses about its
determinants.
We report information about the nature and scale of provision in the two
hundred-odd firms sampled in Table 5.  The data reveal that social provision in late
1993 remained quite extensive in both range and extent four years into the transition
process.  A majority of firms sampled offered holiday subsidies, health care provision
and a housing subsidy.  More than one third of firms offered child care facilities and
almost one third provided some form of food subsidy.  Textual questions allowed the
interviewers to discover more about the extraordinary variety of social provision in
Poland; almost a quarter of sampled firms offered social benefits in addition to the
major five categories in Table 5a; these included arrangements for compassionate
6leave, payments in kind and other gifts such as sending children to recreational
camps.  It is clear from Table 5b that social benefits are not regarded by management
as substitutes for one another; most firms offer three benefits or more and only 10%
of sampled firms offer no social benefits at all.
There are a number of common assertions about social provision that can be
tested on this sample.  The first concerns the relationship between social benefits,
enterprise size and ownership form.  Enterprise provision of social benefits was an
important feature of the large socialist enterprise, and as such seems likely to be
concentrated in state-owned firms, or former state-owned firms.  In contrast, one
might expect very little social provision in the de novo private firms, who would have
to build social assets or use valuable revenue to match state-owned sector provision.
Privatized firms would probably take an intermediate position, with management
gradually seeking to reduce social provision but perhaps having made little progress
in the short term.  An alternative approach to the issue is to note that a variety of
what we call "social benefits" are frequently provided by employers in developed
countries as part of the remuneration package offered to their employees, and that
in many socialist countries the scale of social benefits offered, measured in cost terms,
was not actually extremely high. In Poland, for example, the expenditures of the
social and housing funds (including financial transfers and loans to workers) of
industrial enterprises in the late 1980s amounted to about 5% or so of gross wage
costs.   This view would suggest that emerging private sector firms may need to start4
offering social benefits in order to attract more labour and that they may not find it
prohibitively costly to do so.
An important distinction between commercialized and state-owned firms rests
in their sector and financial situation; the former have been deemed eligible for the
MPP and are likely on average to be in a somewhat better position.  In so far as the
run down of social provision is related to financial distress, one might expect lower
levels of provision in the SOE's.  Given economies of scale in certain forms of social
provision - notably health, creches and perhaps holiday homes - one might expect a
clear correlation between provision and size.  This would operate independently of
the ownership-size relationship noted in Table 1, which established that private firms,
and especially de novo private firms, are smaller than their state-owned counterparts.
7We examine these ideas through a number of cross-tabulations before testing
them more formally in a regression framework.  The relationship between social
provision and ownership is reported in Table 6.  As expected, the frequency of
provision of most benefits is very high in the state sector, and rather lower in the
private sector.  This is true for each type of benefit, and for the number of benefits.
Thus, the majority of SA's and SOE's offer more than three benefits, but no POE's
offer more than two.  However, there are some surprises in Table 6.  Firstly, there is
a higher degree of provision of social benefits in the de novo private sector than one
might have expected; more than half of the sample firms in this ownership category
do make some social provision despite the fact that, as we saw in Table 1, these firms
are typically small or medium-sized.  This suggests that private firms may need to
offer social benefits to compete in the labour market with the state sector.  We return
to this possibility below.
Even more striking is the very high degree of social provision in the privatized
firms; a level by benefit type and by number of benefits, not greatly different to that
observed in the state sector.  Thus only 4% of privatized firms offer no social benefits,
and the pattern of provision matches that of the state-owned firms.  This suggests
that privatization in Poland has not entailed to a significant degree the unbundling -
especially of social assets, and the reduction of non-wage employee provision - that
had been hoped for by some outside observers.  One reason may be that the majority
of privatizations in this period were to insiders - coalitions of managers and workers
- who only had limited interests in unbundling or in adjusting the balance of money
wage to non-wage payments.  An alternative (though not necessarily a competing)
explanation is that the returns to unbundling (cost savings, revenues from sales of
social assets) are often low compared to the returns to keeping these assets in their
current uses.
The relationship between social provision, enterprise size and unionization is
reported in Tables 7 and 8.  Table 7 confirms that provision is extensive in large firms
and modest in small ones, though the picture is not as simple as one might have
expected; more than one quarter of firms employing more than 250 workers provide
fewer than two benefits, while more than one third of small firms provide more than
two benefits.
8Poland is unusual amongst the economies in transition for the magnitude and
importance - political as well as economic - of its trade union movement.  The
Solidarity union played the leading role in bringing down the communist
government, and studies confirm the continued importance of trade unions in
enterprise decision-making (see Estrin, Gelb and Singh, 1993).  In the West, one
would expect some degree of association between the degree of unionization (as a
proxy for employee bargaining power) and the level of remuneration, both in money
wages and via social benefits.  Given the availability of detailed data on this subject
in the questionnaire, the relationship could be investigated in this survey.
The relevant cross tabulations are contained in Table 8.  The de novo private
sector is totally non-unionized, regardless of size and sector.  The proportion of the
labour force unionized is typically more than 30% in all other ownership forms, with
almost one third of firms reporting unionization ratios in excess of 60%.  The largest
proportion of firms are found in the category 31-60% unionized in all three state and
formerly state-owned firm categories.  Unionization is however noticeably lower in
privatized firms, almost one quarter of which have extremely low unionization rates.
The causality, however, almost certainly runs from unionization to ownership form
rather than the other way round.  This is because Polish unions wield significant
influence over the privatization process in firms where they are powerful (see Estrin,
Gelb and Singh, 1993), often to hinder or prevent the ownership change.  Hence
privatization was probably more easily effected in enterprises where unionization
levels were low.
Table 8b indicates that the conventional positive relationship between
unionization and size, holds, in the Polish economy.  Given the findings in Table 1,
Table 8b in part merely reconfirms the relationship between unionization and
ownership type.  However, it is interesting that while unionization rates are low in
both small and middle-sized firms, they are high in around one third of medium-
sized firms and even in 11% of small ones.
Table 8c reveals a clear correlation between the extent of social provision and
the level of unionization.  Note, however, that a reasonable proportion of firms with
virtually zero or very low unionization rates still offer social benefits, and that the
9proportion of firms offering each type of benefit differs little between the 31-60%
unionization and the 61-100% unionization categories.
The descriptive statistics indicate that the nature and scope of social provision
is positively related to ownership form, size of firm and unionization rate.  To test
this view more rigorously, we used regression analysis with the number of benefits
being the dependent variable.  The dependent variable is assumed to convey ordinal
information only  and so we use an ordered logit estimating equation.  In an ordered5
logit procedure, the probability of observing outcome n - here, the number of benefits
- is estimated as a linear function of independent variables and a set of cut-off points
k  corresponding to the set of outcomes:n
Probability(number of benefits=n) = Probability(k  < x $ + u  ≤ k )n-1 i ni
where x  is the vector of independent variables for firm i, $ is the vector ofi
coefficients on the independent variables, and u is an error term, assumed to be
logistically distributed.   By assumption, k  is taken as -∞, and k , where in this case6 -1 N
N is the maximum number of benefits observed in the sample, is taken as +∞.
Ownership type was controlled for via ownership dummy variables (with
state-owned firms as the basis for comparison) and size (after some experimentation,
by the natural logarithm of employment).   Employee bargaining power is proxied7
by the percentage of the labour force which is unionized and by the response to a
qualitative question about the objectives of the firm.   The equation reported in8
Table 9 also tests two other hypotheses that have emerged in our discussion.  The
first is the idea that firms in a less favourable financial situation will be either unable
to offer social benefits - this might apply to de novo private firms - or, if already
providing them in the state sector, will be under pressure to reduce provision.  We
noted above that this might explain the observed differences between SA's and SOE's
in the extent of provision.  We test this view by including as independent variables
two indicators of current enterprise performance:  the growth of sales in 1993 as
against 1992 and the profit margin over sales in 1993.
The second issue raised by the cross tabulations concerns the nature of the
remuneration package offered in the private and state sector respectively, and the
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impact of tax-based incomes policies.  A priori, one might expect that firms which pay
higher money wages would offer fewer social benefits, ceteris paribus.  However, in
enterprise where tax-based incomes policies might potentially apply (e.g. the state
sector) one would expect social provision to be more extensive as a mechanism of
raising total remuneration without breaching tax norms.  We test these ideas by
including the average wage in 1993 and a dummy variable for firms in which the
"popiwek" was binding either in 1992 or 1993.
The results are reported in Table 9, and for the main variables confirm many
of our prior views.  There is no significant difference between SOE's and SA's in the
number of benefits provided, but de novo firms provide significantly fewer (the
coefficient on POE is negative and significantly different from the benchmark
ownership class, which we have taken to be SOE's ).  However, the regression also9
confirms that privatized firms are not statistically significantly different from state-
owned ones in the scale of social provision.  In short, the ownership form division
which is statistically significant in determining social provision is between de novo
private and current and former state-owned firms, rather than between state and
private firms per se.
The size effect on social provision is positive and statistically significant, even
where we control for ownership, and the distribution of the impact is lognormal.
Once we control for size and ownership form, unionization is not quite statistically
significant.   However, the general impact of employee power on non-wage social10
benefits is confirmed by the significant positive coefficient on the dummy variable
indicating the importance of employee preferences in decision-making.
The finding that state-owned and privatized firms do not differ significantly
in the number of benefits offered even after controlling for differences in employee
power is consistent with the proposition that state-owned and formerly state-owned
firms inherit historically accepted norms for the provision of social benefits as part
of their compensation packages.  Employees expect these services, and firms do not
readily drop them even as ownership changes occur.  De novo private firms, by
contrast, have greater leeway and do not have the burden of this historical legacy.
They are freer to arrive at total compensation packages which may or may not
include such non-wage benefits.
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There is only mixed evidence for the effect of the firm's financial situation on
social provision.  Surprisingly, firms which grew fast in 1993 offered fewer social
benefits, even when we control for size and ownership.  This might suggest that
widespread social provision exercises a constraining influence on the growth of the
firm, perhaps because managers are more concerned with employee welfare issues
than with taking advantage of the new growth opportunities.  There is, however, no
significant effect from profit margins, perhaps because social provision is probably
more closely related to previous than current returns on capital.
Finally, the results concerning wage trends appear to refute the view of wages
and social benefits as substitutes - the two are in fact significantly associated in this
equation.  This is consistent with the view of social benefits as part of a typical total
remuneration package offered to employees, as well as with an efficiency wage type-
of-view in which some firms offer high pay in both money and non-money terms.
In the Polish context, the latter may arise from managers and workers agreeing to
extract most or all available surplus to employee remuneration, whether in wages or
non-wage benefits.  Both wages and social provision are therefore less in enterprises
with smaller firm-specific costs to distribute.  Such a view fits with the surprising
finding that social provision is not greater in firms where the tax-based incomes
policy is binding.
The questionnaire also yielded information about the social assets owned by
the firms, which offers a slightly different picture of the nature and scope of social
provision.  The distribution of social assets by type and ownership form is reported
in Table 10.  The most common social asset is holiday homes and housing, followed
closely by health clinics.  In fact creches and cultural assets were very rare in our
sample, and even company dining facilities were relatively infrequent.  The pattern
by ownership is more striking than for the provision of benefits, presumably because
even if they provide benefits, de novo firms have neither the available resources nor
the motivation to purchase social assets.  Thus virtually no de novo private firms own
any social assets at all, and ownership is concentrated in the state-owned sector.
Privatized firms own fewer assets than state-owned ones, though it is unclear
whether this is because the assets have been disposed of, or because privatization was
easier in firms with fewer social assets.
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The relationship between the provision of social benefits and the ownership
of social assets is clarified with reference to Table 11.  Very few firms offer housing
or food assistance without owning the asset.  Moreover, most firms which provide
child-care assistance do not own a creche.  However, the limited ownership of social
assets in health and holiday areas do not present widespread offering of social
benefits.
Table 11 also highlights the differences in the nature of provision between state
and private sectors.  The lack of social assets does not prevent relatively widespread
provision of social benefits in the private sector, especially in the area of health-care.
However, private firms have steered away from social benefits which might entail
large sunk costs in social assets - housing and child care facilities.  In state-owned
firms there is a closer correlation between ownership of assets and social provision.
Finally, we note that only 13 of the firms in our sample had made recent major
investments in social assets.  Although de novo private firms were the most likely to
do so, the percentage of investing POE firms was still only 10%.
3.  The Determinants of Changes in Social Provision
Analysts of transitional economies tend to believe that the provision of social
benefits will decline across the board, because of privatization, tightening budget
constraints and increasing market pressures.  The questionnaire contains information
about changes in the scale of social benefits over the preceding two years which
allow for the testing of some simple hypotheses.
The changes in social provision by ownership type is reported in Table 12, as
the answer to a question about the adjustments in social provision coded in four
categories between an increase and a big fall.  Social provision declined in around
45% of firms, but increased in 7%.  Perhaps more significantly, a majority of firms in
the sample registered either an increase or no change in social provision.  It is clear
from these numbers that while Polish firms may be restructuring in various ways
pre- or post-privatization (see Pinto, Belka and Krajewski, 1994), relatively few of
them are adjusting their provision of social benefits downwards in a significant way.
This is especially apparent in the figures for disposals of social assets - only 32 firms
disposed of social assets between 1991 and 1993, only three of these being privatized
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firms.  The main reason given for asset disposal was to allow the firm to concentrate
on its core business (59% of cases) or to repay debts (19%).  The relatively low
number of asset disposals, and the fairly high frequency of disposals via gifts (nearly
one third) compared to sales or leasings, provide support for our earlier suggestion
that the return to disposals may be relatively low.
The findings by ownership type are also revealing.  The largest falls in social
provision are recorded in the state-owned sector, and especially in SOE's where a
majority of enterprises display some sort of fall.  The decline is more modest in
privatized firms, the absolute majority of which have kept social provision constant!
It is also interesting that de novo private firms are more likely to be increasing than
decreasing provision, though of course the majority keep their level of provision
constant (at or near zero).
In attempting to explain the change in provision of social benefits, we included
in our estimating equation all the factors predicted to be relevant in our
understanding of the level of provision, as well as variables to control for changing
enterprise circumstances, especially financial situation.  Hence as before, we include
ownership dummies, a proxy for size (the natural logarithm of employment) and
indicators of employee power (the unionization rate and our indicator for labour
power).  The equation also contains as independent variables the profit to sales ratio
in 1993, the growth in sales in 1993 and a dummy variable for the imposition of the
tax-based incomes policy.  Since the non-wage benefit is now specified in rate of
change form, the wage variable is also entered as a percentage change.  Finally, the
questionnaire also contains information about whether employee power is increasing
or declining, which is extended to include the proxies for worker's influence over
changes in social provision.  As before, the dependent variable is assumed to contain
ordinal information only and is coded such that a larger value implies a larger
decline in benefits offered.
The results of the ordered logit regression are reported in Table 13.  The
decline in social benefits is most marked in state-owned and commercialized firms;
there is no significant difference between them (SOE's are the benchmark and the
coefficient on the SA dummy variable is insignificantly different from this
benchmark).  However, the decline is significantly less in privatized firms and the
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negative coefficient is even larger (though not significantly so) for de novo private
firms.  Far from encouraging the reduction in social provision, privatization appears
to hinder it!  The size effect, however, follows expectations, with greater declines in
larger firms (the coefficient on log employment is positive), ceteris paribus.  Since we
know that more benefits are provided in larger firms, there is presumably a scale
effect with social benefits tending to be reduced in proportion to initial provision.
Employee power, whether indicated by objectives, changing authority in the firm or
unionization rate, appears to be unrelated to the decline in benefits, suggesting that
observed changes are influenced more by "push" factors (external circumstances) than
by internal structures.
This view is broadly confirmed by looking at the coefficients and t-statistics
on the indicators of the enterprises' economic situation.  Firms with larger profit
margins display significantly smaller declines in social provision, suggesting a pivotal
role of financial circumstances in the decision to reduce provision.  However, since
the recent growth of sales (which may be a better indicator of likely future
profitability) is not significant, changes in social provision may be driven primarily
by short-term financial pressures.  Finally, though we found a positive relationship
between the level of social provision and the level of wages in Table 9, the
relationship breaks down in rate of change form; there is no significant relationship
between the change in benefits and the change in wages in Table 13.  However, we
do find evidence that social provision is being used strategically by firms; benefits are
reduced by less in enterprises in which the tax-based incomes policy is biting.
4.  Conclusions
In this paper, we provide one of the first quantitative evaluations of the scale
of non-wage social provision in transitional economies, as well as a preliminary effort
to explain both the level and the change in provision.  Our main findings are that
social provision remains surprisingly widespread, and has not been greatly reduced
in either the state-owned or the privatized sectors.  Moreover, even de novo private
firms offer a surprising range of social benefits to workers and, if anything, they are
tending to increase rather than reduce the scale of their provision.
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The main determinants of the scale of social provision are ownership structure,
size of firm and employee power, the latter not explicitly via the union structure.
Money wages and the provision of social benefits appear to be complementary rather
than substitutes.  Social assets are concentrated in state-owned firms, but there is
relatively little social asset disposal; the de novo private sector is expanding the range
of social benefits offered but is not investing significantly in social assets.  Changes
in the provision of social benefits have been modest, and are explained by ownership
form, size and profitability.  There is also some evidence of substitution between
money wages and social benefits in firms subject to the tax-based incomes policy.
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1. This paper was prepared for the March 1994 CEPR/IAS Conference on Social
Protection and the Enterprise in Transitional Economies.  The paper is a product of
the World Bank Research Project on Enterprise Behaviour and Economic Reform in
Central and Eastern Europe. 
2. For more on the cooperative sector in transition, see Schaffer (1994).
3. Our sample of 207 firms included 5 cooperatives founded during the
communist period.  Given that the transition has meant control of these cooperatives
was devolved to their members, we classify the 5 cooperatives in our sample as
"privatized" firms, PRE's.
4.  See Rocznik Statystyczny Przemysłu, 1990.
5. That is, we are assuming that the scale of social services implied by "two
benefits" is greater than that implied by "one benefit", and that "three benefits" means
more services than "two benefits", but we make no assumptions about how the jump
in the scale of social provision from "one benefit" to "two benefits" compares to the
jump from "two benefits" to "three benefits".
6. Assuming a normal distribution for the error term corresponds to the ordered
probit estimating procedure.  As it happens, ordered probit estimations gave virtually
identical results.
7. Employment is the relevant indicator since it is workers who receive the non-
wage social benefits, and employment has typically adjusted less than sales or output
to the new market conditions.  Goodness-of-fit tests indicate the dominance of the
logarithmic specification.
8. The variable LPOWER is equal to unity if the firm responds that increasing
wages or employment (rather than profits, sales growth, or some other goal), are its
ENDNOTES
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main objective; zero otherwise.
9. An example of how to interpret the estimated coefficients is as follows.
Consider an SOE firm whose score (the fitted number of benefits obtained by
applying the estimated coefficients to the observed values of the firm's independent
variables) is 9.0.  The cut-off k between three and four benefits offered is 10.41 (_cut3
in Table 9).  The probability that the firm offers four or more benefits is 1 - 1/(1+e(9.0-
 = 20%.  Now consider a firm with identical values for all independent variables10.41)
except that it is a de novo private firm.  The coefficient on the dummy variable POE
is -1.75, and so this firm's score is 9.0-1.75=7.25.  The probability that this firm offers
four or more benefits is 1 - [1/(1+e ] = 4%.(7.25-10.41)
10. Though the extent of social provision is correlated with unionization rates, we
cannot discern an effect independent from enterprise size and ownership.
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Table 1:  Employment Size vs. Ownership
Percentage of firms in given ownership class
           | Ownership
 Employment|
 in 1993   |      POE        PRE         SA        SOE  |    All
------------------+------------------------------------------------------+--------
     < 50  |         31            4           0             5  |      9
------------------+------------------------------------------------------+--------
    51-250 |         62          36            8           28  |     32
------------------+------------------------------------------------------+--------
     > 250 |          8           60          93           67  |     59
------------------+------------------------------------------------------+--------
     Total |       100         100         100         100  |    100
POE Emerging private sector firm
PRE Privatized firm
SA State-owned and commercialized
SOE State-owned, traditional (unincorporated)
NB: Figures may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
Table 2:  Sales Growth in 1993 vs. Ownership
Percentage of firms in given ownership class
 Sales       | Ownership
 growth    |
 in 1993    |      POE        PRE         SA        SOE  |    All
---------------+------------------------------------------------------+--------
   < -10%   |          5          12          20           16  |     14
---------------+------------------------------------------------------+--------
-10 to 10% |         22          29          53           43  |     38
---------------+------------------------------------------------------+--------
   >  10%   |         73          59          28           41  |     48
---------------+------------------------------------------------------+--------
     Total   |        100        100         100         100  |    100
POE Emerging private sector firm
PRE Privatized firm
SA State-owned and commercialized
SOE State-owned, traditional (unincorporated)
NB: Figures may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
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Table 3:  Employment Growth in 1993 vs. Ownership
Percentage of firms in given ownership class
 Employment | Ownership
 growth     |
 in 1993    |      POE        PRE         SA        SOE  |    All
-------------------+------------------------------------------------------+--------
   < -10%   |         18          30          28           37  |     30
-------------------+------------------------------------------------------+--------
-10 to 10%  |         32          64          73           58  |     57
-------------------+------------------------------------------------------+--------
   >  10%  |         50           7            0             5  |     13
-------------------+------------------------------------------------------+--------
     Total  |        100        100         100         100  |    100
POE Emerging private sector firm
PRE Privatized firm
SA State-owned and commercialized
SOE State-owned, traditional (unincorporated)
NB: Figures may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
Table 4:  Profit Margin in 1993 vs. Ownership
Percentage of firms in given ownership class
 Profit      | Ownership
 margin    |
 in 1993    |      POE        PRE         SA        SOE  |    All
---------------+------------------------------------------------------+--------
   < -5%    |         10          29          37           46  |     33
---------------+------------------------------------------------------+--------
 -5 to 5%  |          58          40          24           43  |     42
---------------+------------------------------------------------------+--------
   >  5%    |         33           31         39           11  |     25
---------------+------------------------------------------------------+--------
     Total   |       100         100         100         100  |    100
POE Emerging private sector firm
PRE Privatized firm
SA State-owned and commercialized
SOE State-owned, traditional (unincorporated)
NB: Figures may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
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Table 5: Scope of Social Provision in Late 1993
a.    By Benefit Type
Benefit Percentage of firms
1. Child care 34
2. Health care 64
3. Food subsidy/cafeteria 29
4. Housing/housing subsidy 52
5. Holiday subsidy/resort 74
6. Other responses (volunteered               24
by the interviewee), e.g.
- Travel assistance  3
- Compassionate leave 11
- Payment in kind  3
- Children's recreational camps etc.  7
- Cultural events  2
NB:  Since the responses in (6) were volunteered by the interviewee, the frequencies
are not directly comparable with those for (1)-(5).
b.    By Number of Benefits
Number of benefits Percentage of firms
none     10
   1     10
   2     25
   3     24
 > 3     31
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Table 6:  Social Benefits and Ownership
a.   By Benefit Type
% of firms in ownership class providing benefit
Benefit type      POE      PRE      SA     SOE
1.  Child care  8         47      46        34
2.  Health care 30         64      83        70
3.  Food subsidy/cafeteria 10         31      41        31
4.  Housing/housing subsidy  3         49      78        65
5.  Holiday subsidy/resort 15         80      95        89
b.    By Number of Benefits
% of firms in ownership class
  
Number of benefits        POE       PRE          SA       SOE
none 45  4  0  1
   1 28  2  5  7
   2 28 33 12 25
   3  0 27 32 31
         > 3  0 33 51 36
POE Emerging private sector firm
PRE Privatized firm
SA State-owned and commercialized
SOE State-owned, traditional (unincorporated)
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Table 7:  Social Benefits by Size Class
a.    By Benefit Type
% of firms in size class providing benefit
Benefit type           L ≤ 50        51-250 L         L > 250
1.  Child care 11 21    45
2.  Health care 33 45    78
3.  Food subsidy/cafeteria  6  9    43
4.  Housing/housing subsidy 22 32    68
5.  Holiday subsidy/resort 22 59    89
b.    By Number of Benefits
% of firms in size class providing benefit
Number of Benefits       L ≤ 50         51-250 L L > 250
none 39 21     0
   1 28 12     6
   2 17 35    20
   3 17 21    27
 > 3  0 11    47
POE Emerging private sector firm
PRE Privatized firm
SA State-owned and commercialized
SOE State-owned, traditional (unincorporated)
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Table 8:  Unionization, Ownership Structure and Social Provision
a.    Unionization by Ownership Type
% of firms in ownership class
% of labour force unionized     POE     PRE      SA     SOE     All
       <  10%            100       24         5        11      30
    11 -  30%    0        18         5        19      12
    31 -  60%              0        47        59        51      42
    61 - 100%                0        11        32        20      16
b.    Unionization and Size
% of firms in size class
% of labour force unionized    L ≤ 50              51-250 L         L > 250
       <  10% 78 56     7
    11 -  30% 11 11    13
    31 -  60%  0 24    58
    61 - 100% 11  9    21
c.    Unionization and Social Benefits
% of labour force unionized
% of firms in
unionization class
providing:           < 10%          11-30%        31-60%      61-100%
1.  Child care 17 24 44 47
2.  Health care 34 68 74 88
3.  Food subsidy/cafeteria 13 36 37 33
4.  Housing/housing subsidy 19 56 69 68
5.  Holiday subsidy/resort 34 84 91 97
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Table 9:  Number of Social Benefits, Ordered Logit Estimates
Ordered Logit Estimates                                  Number of obs =     189
                                                              chi2(10)     = 172.36
                                                           Prob > chi2   = 0.0000
Log Likelihood = -244.87871                                    Pseudo R2     = 0.2603
Dependent variable: num_bens
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
         |      Coef.     Std. Err.       t       P>|t|    [95% Conf. Interval]
------------------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
log_yg93 |  -1.340359   .5626419     -2.382   0.018      -2.450623   -.2300945
       w93 |    .052068    .0120792      4.311   0.000       .0282319    .0759037
      log_l |   1.062006   .1808166      5.873   0.000       .7051998    1.418813
profmarg |   -.006084   .0056119     -1.084   0.280      -.0171582    .0049898
   lpower |    .598881   .2852406      2.100   0.037       .0360145    1.161748
unionper |    .012930   .0078239      1.653   0.100       -.002509     .028369
   tipbind |    .199253   .3521816      0.566   0.572      -.4957088    .8942148
          sa |   -.193438   .3861624     -0.501   0.617      -.9554538    .5685787
         pre |   -.604971   .4417241     -1.370   0.173      -1.476628    .2666856
        poe |  -1.749283   .6304030     -2.775   0.006      -2.993261   -.5053055
------------------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
      _cut0 |    5.07142   1.166912
      _cut1 |    6.94938   1.182920  
      _cut2 |    8.77055   1.218266  
      _cut3 |   10.41410   1.286335  
      _cut4 |   12.08071   1.365897  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
num_bens Number of (core) social benefits offered: child care, health care, food
subsidy/cafeteria, housing/housing subsidy, holiday subsidy/resort
log_yg93 Sales growth in 1993 (log form)
w93 Average wage in 1993
log_l Natural log of employment
profmarg Profit/sales ratio in %
lpower Dummy variable, = 1 if wage or employment growth are among the
main objectives of the firm, 0 otherwise
unionper Percentage unionization
tipbind Dummy variable, = 1 the tax-based incomes policy ("popiwek") was
binding in 1992 or 1993, 0 otherwise
sa Dummy variable, = 1 if firm is state-owned and commercialized, 0
otherwise
pre Dummy variable, = 1 if firm is privatized, 0 otherwise
poe Dummy variable, = 1 if firm is de novo private, 0 otherwise
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_cut0 Upper cut-off k  corresponding to break between zero benefits and one0
benefit offered (see text).
_cut1 Upper cut-off k  corresponding to break between one benefit and two1
benefits offered.
_cut2 Upper cut-off k  corresponding to break between two and three benefits2
offered.
_cut3 Upper cut-off k  corresponding to break between three and four benefits3
offered.
_cut4 Upper cut-off k  corresponding to break between four and five benefits4
offered.
Bottom cut-off k  = -∞ and top cut-off k  = +∞ by assumption.-1 5
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Table 10:  Social Assets by Ownership Form
% of firms in ownership class owning asset
Asset type                POE      PRE       SA      SOE      All
1.  Creche                       0          0         5           5         3
2.  Health clinic                0         22       63         58        40
3.  Buffet/cafeteria                3         22       37         27        23
4.  Apartments                   0         33        71        53        42
5.  Hostel for workers           0         18        27         14        15
6.  Holiday resort/               5         29        76         63        47
    facilities
POE Emerging private sector firm
PRE Privatized firm
SA State-owned and commercialized
SOE State-owned, traditional (unincorporated)
Table 11:  Provision of Social Benefits vs. Ownership of Social Assets
Percentage of firms in ownership class
Column 1 (SO): Provision of social benefit
Column 2 (NA): Provision of social benefit WITHOUT ownership of
corresponding social asset
                   POE          PRE          SA          SOE          All
No. of firms          40             45           41             81          207
                      SO   NA     SO   NA    SO   NA   SO   NA   SO   NA
Child care        8     8      47     47     46     41    35     30    34     31
Health care              30   30      64     42     83     20    70     12     64    24
Cafeteria                10     8      31      9     42      5     31      4     29     6
Housing           3     3      49       9    78       5    65       9    52      7
Holiday-related          15   10      80      51    95     20    89     26     74    27
SO: Service offered
NA: No ownership of asset
POE Emerging private sector firm
PRE Privatized firm
SA State-owned and commercialized
SOE State-owned, traditional (unincorporated)
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Table 12:  Change in Level of Social Provision 1991-93 vs. Ownership
Percentage of firms in given ownership class
 Change in | Ownership
 level of     |
 benefits    |      POE        PRE         SA        SOE   |    All
----------------+------------------------------------------------------+---------
 Increase    |        13            7           5             5   |      7
----------------+------------------------------------------------------+---------
 Constant   |        83           51         41            31  |     47
----------------+------------------------------------------------------+---------
 Small fall  |         3            27         29            21  |     20
----------------+------------------------------------------------------+---------
 Big fall     |         3            16         24            43  |     26
----------------+------------------------------------------------------+---------
     Total    |      100          100        100           100  |    100
POE Emerging private sector firm
PRE Privatized firm
SA State-owned and commercialized
SOE State-owned, traditional (unincorporated)
NB: Figures may not sum to 100 due to rounding.
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Table 13:  Change in Level of Social Provision, Ordered Logit Estimates
Ordered Logit Estimates                                 Number of obs =    186
                                                            chi2(12)      =  58.29
                                                           Prob > chi2   = 0.0000
Log Likelihood = -193.50035                              Pseudo R2     = 0.1309
Dependent variable: dec_bens
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
         |      Coef.   Std. Err.       t     P>|t|       [95% Conf. Interval]
--------------------+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
log_yg93   |  .3285795  .5487357    0.599   0.550          -.7544554   1.411614
log_wg93   | -.2307489  .2269670   -1.017   0.311          -.6787117   .2172139
   log_l   |  .4291567  .1771566    2.422   0.016           .0795043     .778809
profmarg   | -.0168792  .0063358   -2.664   0.008          -.0293842   -.0043741
  lpower   |  .1421633  .3026764    0.470   0.639          -.4552265    .7395531
lpow_con   | -.1308180  .4675894   -0.280   0.780          -1.053695    .7920591
lpow_dwn   |  .3375714  .5613917    0.601   0.548          -.7704425    1.445585
unionper   |  -.0029661 .0089083   -0.333   0.740          -.0205483     .014616
 tipbind   |  -.6912439 .3623595   -1.908   0.058           -1.40643    .0239418
        sa   |  -.7525479 .4219571   -1.783   0.076           -1.585361   .0802652
       pre   | -1.3462390 .4516796   -2.981   0.003          -2.237715    -.454763
      poe   | -2.2297960 .6776825   -3.290   0.001          -3.567333   -.8922604
--------------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    _cut0   |  -1.811747   1.13902
    _cut1   |   1.693163   1.11465  
    _cut2   |   2.770431   1.12681  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
dec_bens Decline in scale of social benefits in the preceding two years
(1=increase, 2=constant, 3=small decline, 4=big decline)
log_yg93 Sales growth in 1993 (log form)
log_w93 Real wage growth in 1993 (log form)
log_l Natural log of employment
profmarg Profit/sales ratio in %
lpower Dummy variable, = 1 if wage or employment growth are among the
main objectives of the firm, 0 otherwise
lpow_up Dummy variable, = 1 if firm said labour power had been increasing
over the preceding two years, 0 otherwise [DROPPED]
lpow_con Dummy variable, = 1 if firm said labour power had been constant over
the preceding two years, 0 otherwise
lpow_dwn Dummy variable, = 1 if firm said labour power had been falling over
the preceding two years, 0 otherwise
unionper Percentage unionization
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tipbind Dummy variable, = 1 the tax-based incomes policy ("popiwek") was
binding in 1992 or 1993, 0 otherwise
sa Dummy variable, = 1 if firm is state-owned and commercialized, 0
otherwise
pre Dummy variable, = 1 if firm is privatized, 0 otherwise
poe Dummy variable, = 1 if firm is de novo private, 0 otherwise
_cut0 Upper cut-off k  corresponding to break between an increase and no0
change in social benefits offered (see text).
_cut1 Upper cut-off k  corresponding to break between no change and a small1
fall in social benefits offered.
_cut2 Upper cut-off k  corresponding to break between a small fall and a2
large fall in social benefits offered.
Bottom cut-off k  = -∞ and top cut-off k  = +∞ by assumption.-1 3
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